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Endogenous Reversals of Fortune 
 
The phenomenon of systemic changes in the fortunes of social groups is hard to reconcile 
with traditional macroeconomic models of intergenerational mobility. This paper, therefore, 
proposes a theory of endogenous reversal of fortune, whereby instilling strict work norms is 
an instrument to address moral hazard in poor families more so than in rich families, which is 
consistent with empirical regularities pertaining to work attitudes. The mechanism implies that 
hard-working children of the poor may eventually overtake leisure-prone children of the rich. 
This evolution, in particular, of work norms, is endogenously determined and is, therefore a 
better explanation of the rise and the fall of population groups than existing theories that rely 
on exogenous ability variations. 
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1. Introduction 
Intergenerational mobility issues have long been of interest for economists both theoretically 
and empirically (e.g., Becker, 1981, Becker and Tomes, 1988, Loury, 1981).  Typically, innate 
ability differences play an essential role in theories explaining intergenerational mobility, see 
e.g., Maoz and Moav, 1999, Mookherjee and Napel, 2006, for recent models.  This, however, is 
difficult to reconcile with historical rise and fall of entire groups of individuals.
1  The fall and 
rise of social elites is one such example.  European nobility, dominant in earlier centuries, gave 
away its power and the landowner class lost much of its economic significance in the course of 
the  nineteenth  century;  in  contrast,  the  bourgeoisie  and  the  intelligentsia,  rose  to  become 
dominating  social  classes  (see  Bertocchi,  2006,  for  a  detailed  discussion).    Another  set  of 
important examples constitute religious or ethnic groups as well as immigrants.  In particular, 
the latter - typically without much physical capital or educational background – often are more 
upward socially mobile than the locals in the host societies.
2   
  Social thinkers, when put to the task of addressing these phenomena, have often singled 
out norms, such as hard work or the drive for educational attainment, as an explaining factor.  
The famous Weberian work ethic argument is just one, the most prominent of such theories.  
This  line  of  reasoning,  however,  leaves  unexplained  the  emergence  of  such  norms,  in 
particular, among relatively disadvantaged individuals. 
                                                            
1 Among the many factors that work against mobility are differential access to credit between the poor and the 
rich,  especially  coupled  with  opportunities  for  private  schooling,  and  differential  access  to  influential  social 
networks.   3
  Recent research in economics has attempted to endogenize culturally transmitted norms 
that may have economic implications.  For example, Bisin and Verdier, 2001, offer a general 
approach to the intergenerational transmission of preferences; Gradstein and Justman, 2002, 
discuss  its  implications  in  the  context  of  comparison  of  schooling  systems;  Botticini  and 
Eckstein,  2005,  2006,  deal  with  some  of  its  labor  market  implications;  and  Becker  and 
Woesmann, 2007, empirically argue that the leading factor behind the Weberian work ethic 
attributed to Protestantism was not its religious slant, but rather its emphasis on human capital 
acquisition. 
  This paper’s goal is to provide a framework for the analysis of the dynastic “reversal of 
fortune”  across  generations,  especially  focusing  on  an  endogenous  mechanism  for  its 
emergence.  In particular, I study incentive issues within a family and parental instilling of 
work attitudes as the means to boost up children incentives.
3  The possibility of such attitudes 
being inversely related to family wealth is exhibited – implying spoiled children of rich parents 
and hard working children of poor parents.
4  Survey based evidence, discussed below, strongly 
indicates existence of such inverse relationship.  This, in turn, may imply impoverishment of 
rich dynasties relative to the poor ones, which is in particular consistent with the success of 
second generation immigrants well documented in the literature, see Carliner, 1980, Chiswick, 
1977, Card, 2005. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Specific examples include ethnic Indians in Africa and ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, see Sowell, 1996, for a more 
detailed account. 
3 The evolving literature on the formation on social norms has proceeded mainly along two lines.  One line 
emphasizes cultural evolution; Galor and Moav, 2002, is a seminal contribution that applies this approach to study 
long run economic growth.  This paper is along the second line that focuses on deliberate socialization as in the 
above cited papers.   4
  The paper is related to the literature on intergenerational income mobility, as in Becker 
and Tomes, 1986, Loury, 1981, Maoz and Moav, 1999, Mookherjee and Napel, 2006.  The 
emphasis here, however, is on the endogenization of the rise and fall of dynasties, as opposed 
to attributing it to random variations in abilities.  This, of course, is not to suggest that the latter 
is not relevant, and the two approaches should be rather viewed as complementary.  Bertocchi, 
2006,  and  Galor  and  Moav,  2006,  are  the  only  papers  we  are  aware  of  that  pursue  the 
endogenization route, both to address the demise of the traditional class structure.  The former 
paper focuses on the changes in the inheritance laws, whereas the latter paper attributes it to the 
(endogenous)  emergence  of  public  education  in  the  context  of  economic  growth;  here,  in 
contrast,  the  emphasis  is  on  the  evolution  of  work  attitudes.    While  the  paper  provides  a 
complementary to the above work explanation to the demise of aristocracy, it is also consistent 
with economic successes of second generation immigrants, as discussed more in detail below. 
Another relevant literature is on the implications of the transmission of social norms as 
in  Botticini  and  Eckstein,  2005,  2006,  and  Becker  and  Woesmann,  2007.    Of  most  direct 
relevance here is Doepke and Zilibotti, 2007 (also Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005), who also study 
the implications of time preference as well as work norms on social mobility focusing on the 
occupational choices.
5  While closely related to this paper’s interest, Doepke and Zilibotti’s, 
2007,  mechanism  is  very  much  different  from  the  one  exhibited  below;  in  particular,  they 
consider  the  slope  of  the  earnings’  profile  across  generations  as  the  determining  factor, 
ignoring  family  incentives,  considered  crucial  here.    Specifically,  in  Doepke  and  Zilibotti, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 This captures the so called “Carnegie effect”, according to which inherited wealth “deadens the talents and energies of 
the son, and tempts him to lead a less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise would."   5
2007, the poor prefer their children to be patient and hard working in anticipation of their 
choosing  an  occupation  with  a  steep  wage  increase,  so  that  aspects  of  preferences  and 
occupation choices are mutually reinforcing.  Here, in contrast, the poor instill in their children 
working  habits  as  a  commitment  device,  to  minimize  children  dependence  on  parental 
transfers.
6  The two approaches should be viewed as complementary. 
A third related strand is the literature on family interaction, starting with Becker’s 1974, 
seminal  work.    Gatti,  2005  (see  also  the  references  therein),  for  example,  discusses  the 
efficiency implications of parental inability to commit to transfers.   Lindbeck and Nyberg, 
2006, analyze instilling work norms as parental instrument to reduce children moral hazard; but 
they ignore the effect of parental wealth in this regard, as well as its dynamic implications.  In 
the model below, aspects of family interactions featured in the literature are imbedded in a 
dynamic dynastical context to address the issues at hand. 
  The  rest  of  the  paper  proceeds  as  follows.    Section  2  discusses  some  empirical 
motivation.  The model is then introduced in Section 3, followed by its analysis, in Section 4.  





                                                                                                                                                                                                    
5 On the latter aspect, see also Galor and Tsiddon, 1997, whose model's implications are remarkably consistent 
with the swings in the US income distribution.   6
2. Motivation 
Several  pieces  of  historical  and  empirical  evidence  motivate  this  research.    Recent  work 
Bertocchi, 2006, and Doepke and Zilibotti, 2007, argues that landowner classes in European 
countries did not reap at all the opportunities offered by the Industrial Revolution, which is 
viewed as surprising given their economic wealth and political clout.  This is interpreted as the 
unwillingness on their part to forgo immediate life comfort in order to pursue for the young 
children  demanding  occupational  careers;  in  contrast,  middle  classes  were  prepared  to 
undertake long term human capital investments.  Further, it is argued that the consumption of 
leisure by the landed aristocracy  was measurable higher, whereas industrious and financial 
investment activity was lower, than in the case of the middle class.    
  Evidence  on  the  economic  assimilation  of  immigrants  is  in  some  sense  even  more 
relevant.    Semi-anecdotal  stories  about  immigrants'  hard  working  attitudes  and  economic 
successes are abundant, see Sowell, 1996, for these in the context of several ethnic immigrant 
groups.    A  more carefully  compiled  piece  of  evidence  comes  from  the  analysis  of  second 
generation immigrants.
7   This literature has followed the lead of Chiswick, 1977, 1978, who 
finds income convergence across the first two immigration cohorts in the US.  Borjas, 1993, in 
the US context and Hammarstedt and Palme, 2006, in the context of Sweden, using detailed 
datasets find strong evidence of income convergence from the first to the second generation of 
immigrants;  both  works  also  discern  a  large  variation  across  the  immigrants'  countries  of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 There some additional, more minor differences, such as the modeling of the motivation behind instilling of work 
attitudes: in Doepke and Zilibotti, 2007, this is driven solely by altruism, whereas in the model below, the parents 
also value their children sharing similar work attitudes. 
7 Defined as local-born individuals to foreign-born parents.   7
origin, which in itself is a significant contributing factor to the immigrants' earnings.  More 
importantly for this paper's argument, Card, 2005, reviewing several recent studies in the US 
context, comes to the conclusion that second generation immigrants not only close the gap, but 
– controlling for the country of origin - have higher education levels than the natives in their 
cohort, indicating a reversal of fortunes.
8  
  Micro evidence on how family income shapes schooling and work attitudes is scarce.  
Thus, Jacob and Lefgren, 2007, find that low-income parents tend to place a larger weight of 
their  children  scholastic  achievements  relative  to  high-income  parents,  who  instead  value 
children general satisfaction with the attended school.  Another piece of tentative evidence is 
survey  based.    The  World  Values  Surveys,  a  world  wide  survey  carried  out  by  the  Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) that comprises individual 
cross national questions on a wide variety of topics, provide an opportunity to get a sense to 
which the inverse relationship between material background and work attitudes holds in a large 
sample of countries and respondents.  Data in these surveys are generated from face to face 
interviews to a sampling universe of adult citizens 15 years old and older, and we focus on the 
fourth wave in the course of which tens of thousands of individuals were surveyed during 
1997-2004.    
        Insert Table 1 Here 
 
Table 1 presents illustrative regression results.
9  Its first two columns focus on the question that 
                                                            
8 Specifically, vast majority of country-of-origin groups have done better than the natives.  It should, however, be noted 
that the number of truly longitudinal studies on these issues, especially outside of the US, is limited.   
9 The dependent variables are categorical, and thus the coefficients are estimated using ordered probits.     8
seeks  the  extent  of  agreement  with  the  statement  "Work  is  what  makes  life  worth  living,  not 
leisure".
10  The specification in its first column includes individual income as well as gender and 
family status characteristics.  Income is seen to be negatively related to the value of work and is 
strongly significant.  One potential concern is that this relationship is driven by education: more 
educated individuals may work more and hence value more leisure on the margin.  To address this 
issue, the second column adds the education variable.  Indeed, this variable is significant and is 
negatively related to work attitude.  Further, the statistical significance of the income variable is 
somewhat reduced; however, it still remains highly significant.  Qualitatively equivalent findings 
are  obtained  when  the  dependent  variable  refers  to  a  different  question  in the  surveys,  "Work 
should always come first, even if it means less spare time"; see columns 3 and 4 for its analysis.  
The results are very much similar to the ones in columns 1 and 2.  Overall, therefore, survey data is 






3. The model 
Consider an OLG economy, with an infinite number of households, indexed i, consisting each 
of a parent and a child, operating in discrete time t.  A household is initially characterized by 
income yi0 > 0 and by a work norm, 0 < δi0 < 1, whose both distributions are given and are 
independent; incomes and work norms in future periods will be endogenously determined in 
the model.  The family’s child is endowed with one unit of time. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
10 The definitions of the variables used are described in the appendix.   9
  In  each  generation  income  is  disposed  by  the  parent,  and  is  allocated  between 
consumption, cit, and bequest transfers to the child, bit+1 while respecting the budget constraint 
 
  yit = cit + bit+1                    (1) 
 
The parents also instill in children work attitudes or work norms, represented by the parameter 
δit+1, normalized to lie in the unit interval.  This assumption is consistent with the theories of 
deliberate socialization, as in, for example, Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Gradstein and Justman, 
2002.  Most of the literature in social psychology views the parents as the primary source of 
social influence and also attests to the importance of parental socialization of work attitudes, 
see Eccles et al., 2000.   As an extension below I briefly discuss some more general forms of 
cultural transmission.   
  The assumption of there being just one offspring greatly simplifies the analytics.  With 
multiple  offspring,  intergenerational  strategic  interactions  could  become  more  involved, 
especially when the parents are able to manipulate the inheritance rule.  Recent work addresses 
empirical  inheritance  patterns,  such  as  the  fact  that  most  parents  choose  equal  division  of 
wealth among the offspring. In this context, Bernheim and Severinov, 2003, show how by 
equally  dividing bequests,  the  parents  can  signal patterns  of intergenerational  altruism  that 
minimize their children moral hazard.  We abstract from these issues here. 
The young individual allocates time between effort nit+1 and leisure, 1- nit+1.  The effort 
could be interpreted as work, and it generates income of at+1nit+1 where at+1 is the exogenously 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 Adding additional controls, such as the respondent's age or political attitudes, qualitatively reinforces this conclusion.    10 
given labor  productivity parameter.    The next-period  income  is  then  jointly  determined  by 
parental transfers and young worker’s effort, 
 
  yit+1 = at+1nit+1 + bit+1                  (2) 
 
The young individual’s utility is defined over income and leisure, as follows: 
 
  V(yit+1, 1-nit+1) = log(yit+1) + (1-δit+1)log(2-nit+1)          (3) 
where  0 < δit+1 < 1 is interpreted as the work attitude or the work norm and is determined by 
the parents.
12 
Parents are altruistic toward the children, and they derive utility from consumption; 
incur an emotional cost from having children with different work attitudes than themselves; and 
their utility  subsumes  their  child’s  one.    While  parents  may have  multiple  motivations  for 
instilling work attitudes in their children, sharing a common values system is most likely one of 
these, as is evidenced in the social psychology literature (see Eccles et al., 2000, and references 
therein).  This motivation is also related to the vertical transmission of cultural values in the 
influential work of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981, and Boyd and Richerson, 1985.  We, in 
particular, assume the following specification: 
 
U(δit+1, cit, V) = -C(δit+1 -δit) + log(cit) + V(yit+1, 1-nit+1) =   11 
-C(δit+1 -δit) + log(cit) + log(yit+1) + (1-δit+1)log(2-nit+1)        (4) 
 
where C’, C” > 0.   
  A period describes a lifespan.  In each period, the sequence of events is as follows.  
First, the parents instill work attitudes by setting δit+1.  Then the young individual allocates unit 
of time between effort and leisure.  Finally, the parents determine the bequest transfers that 
jointly with the young individuals’ efforts determine next period income.  In equilibrium, these 
choices have to be mutually consistent.
13 
   
 
4. Analysis 
We proceed backwards.  At the last stage, the parents leave bequests that maximize the utility 
(4), while taking account of (2), respecting the budget constraint (1) and treating prior choices 
as given.  Analysis of the first order conditions, 
  -1/(yit - bit+1) + 1/(anit+1 + bit+1) < 0 
 
and assuming internal solutions for simplicity, reveals that the optimal budget allocation is 
given as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
12 Many of the results go through for general sub-utility functions, as was shown in the previous version of the paper; 
the logarithmic specification generates particularly tractable analysis.  Note that the derivative of the sub-utility from 
leisure is positive when the individual only consumes leisure, which constitutes a further analytical simplification. 
13 The basic intra-period decision making structure is similar to Lindbeck and Nyberg,  2006, with two main 
differences.  First, Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006, essentially assume group influences on the social norm; whereas   12 
  bit+1 = (yit - at+1nit+1)/2, cit = yit+1 = (yit + at+1nit+1)/2          (5) 
  
Anticipating these decisions, the young now allocate the time unit between effort and leisure so 
as  to  maximize  (4).    In  other  words,  a  young  individual  makes  her  choices  acting  as  a 
Stackelberg leader with respect to her parent. 
  Assuming internal solutions for simplicity, the first order conditions optimally balance 
the contribution of work to the young person's income and the consumption of leisure, and are 
formally given as follows: 
 
  at+1/( yit + at+1nit+1) - (1-δit+1) /(2-nit+1) = 0            (6) 
and the second order conditions  hold as revealed by differentiating the left hand side in (6); the 
equilibrium amount of work is then given by: 
  nit+1 = [2 - (1-δit+1) yit/ at+1]/(2-δit+1)              (7) 
 
It will be useful to observe that a corner solution, nit+1 = 1, is obtained whenever δit+1 > (1-
δit+1)yit/ at+1] and, in particular, when δit+1 is close to one, or when the family income level is 
small enough.  Likewise, nit+1 = 0, is obtained whenever (1-δit+1) yit/ at+1 > 2 and, in particular, 
when δit+1 is small enough, or when family income is large enough. 
Also note that 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
here, instead, work norms are transmitted within a family, through individual decisions. More importantly, their 
utility assumptions essentially assume away potential income effects, which are essential here.   13 
1- nit+1  = [-δit+1 + (1-δit+1)yit/ at+1] / (2 -δit+1); 2- nit+1  = (1-δit+1)(2+yit/ at+1) / (2 -δit+1)  (8) 
               
As revealed by differentiating (7), young individuals’ work time increases in the work 
norm parameter δit+1, more so the higher parental income: 
dnit+1 / dδit+1 = (2+ yit/ at+1)/ (2 -δit+1)
2 > 0, and  d
2nit+1 /dyit dδit+1 > 0    (9)  
 
and decreases in family income: 
  dnit+1 / dyit = - [(1-δit+1)/ at+1]/(2-δit+1)   
 
Both results are intuitive, as stricter work norms imply a lower marginal utility from leisure; 
and a higher level of family income leads to higher future bequests.  It then also follows that 
future income, yit+1, increases in the work attitude, as revealed by differentiation of yit+1 in (5). 
Before proceeding to analyze parental instilling of work norms, it is useful to compare 
the Stackelberg equilibrium solutions derived above to the corresponding values that would 
have been chosen by the parents had they control over children time allocation decisions.  In 
the latter case, parental optimal choices satisfy the first-order conditions: 
-1/(yit-bit+1) + 1/( bit+1+at+1nit+1) = 0,    
at+1/( bit+1+ at+1nit+1) – (1-δit+1)/(2- nit+1) = 0             
 
Solving this system we obtain:   14 
nit+1
C = [2 - (1-δit+1) yit/2at+1]/ [1 + (1-δit+1)/2],  bit+1
C = [(2-δit+1) yit - 2at+1]/ [1 + (1-δit+1)/2]
              
and direct comparisons with the equilibrium values above establish the following intuitive 
results: 
 
Proposition 1. For given work norms, the chosen equilibrium effort by the young is smaller 
and the amount of parental transfer is larger than the ones the parents would have chosen 
having full control over both decisions.
14 
 
The key here is the moral hazard of the child, who – anticipating parental altruistic transfer – 
puts in too little effort from parental perspective.  This is similar to the results in Gatti, 2005 
(see also the work cited there), which in turn builds upon Becker, 1974, 1981. It is essential for 
these results that the parents are unable to make their bequests fully contingent on children 
efforts; and that the scope for intergenerational bargaining on these issues is limited. 
These  results  suggest  some  of the  motivations  parents  have  when  molding  children 
attitudes. A stricter work norm would increase the child’s work effort, potentially bringing it 
closer to parental bliss point.  A counter-balancing factor is the smaller utility from child’s 
leisure that is also valued by the parents.  And a final consideration is parental desire to have 
children with work norms similar to themselves. 
                                                            
14 Further, in the previous version of the paper it was also shown that the period equilibrium choices are socially 
sub-optimal for given work norms.    
   15 
  We now turn to formally study the determination of work norms by the parents.  In 
contemplating  so  doing,  the  parents  maximize  their  utility  while  anticipating  the  decisions 
above.  Employing the envelope theorem, the resulting first order conditions are as follows: 
 
-C’(δit+1 -δit) + (at+1/(yit + at+1nit+1)) dnit+1 /dδit+1 - log(2-nit+1) =  
-C’(δit+1 -δit) + [(1-δit+1)/(2- nit+1)][(yit/ at+1 +2)/(2-δit+1)
2] - log(2-nit+1) =  
-C’(δit+1 -δit) + 1/(2-δit+1) – log(2-nit+1) = 0             (10) 
 
The three terms in (10) represent, respectively, parental psychic cost of having a child with 
different  work  norms  than  herself;  the  contribution  of  stronger  work  norms  for  the  child's 
income; and the reduction in child's utility from leisure as a consequence of work oriented 
attitudes.  We assume that the left-hand side in (10) is positive at δit+1 = 0 and is negative at 
δit+1 = 1, implying that (10) characterizes a utility maximizing work norm whenever the second 
order conditions hold, that is, when 
 
  S.o.c. = -C"(δit+1 -δit) + 1/(2-δit+1)
2 + 1/ [(1-δit+1) (2-δit+1)] < 0      (11)
                 
As  is  clear  from  (11),  parental  aversion  to  changes  in  work  norms  across  generations  is 
necessary to ensure the concavity of parental utility function with respect to offspring's work 
norm.   16 
Totally differentiating (10) we first obtain dδit+1/dδit > 0, implying intergenerational 
transmission of work norms.  This result is well consistent with recent empirical work that 
testifies  to  the  importance  of  the  origin  country  in  determining  the  earnings  of  second 
generation immigrants, see Borjas, 1993, 1995, and Fernandez and Fogli, 2007.  The latter 
paper specifically focuses on culture as a crucial determinant of work attitudes, concluding that 
cultural factors are transmitted from the first to the second immigrant generations. 
Further, differentiation with respect to income reveals that 
 
  dδit+1/dyit = 1/[(S.o.c) (yit+2at+1)] < 0             (12) 
 
so that the preferred work attitude for one’s child is a decreasing (and convex as is revealed by 
differentiating the left-hand side in (12)) function of family income.  The intuition for this 
result is as follows.  To constrain the child’s moral hazard, all parents consider strengthening 
work norms.  Because of the income effect, the adverse implications of moral hazard for the 
parents are more detrimental in poorer families, where young work more, and who are then 
more willing to instill strict work norms in their children to induce a lower degree of shirking. 
  Summarizing,  
 
Proposition 2.  Parental work attitudes have a positive effect and parental incomes have a 
negative effect on instilled norms. 
   17 
We now examine the implication of these results for the next-period income. The latter 
can be written as follows: 
 
  yit+1 = (yit + at+1nit+1)/2 = (yit + 2at+1)/2(2-δit+1)           (13)    
 
Differentiation of (13) reveals that dyit+1 / dδit = [(yit + 2at+1)/2(2-δit+1)
2] dδit+1 / dδit > 0, so that 
a stricter parental work attitude generates – through the instilling of stricter work norms in the 
children – a higher level of next-period income.  Differentiation of (13) with respect to parental 
income yields: 
 
  dyit+1 / dyit = 1/[2(2-δit+1)] + [(yit + 2at+1)/2(2-δit+1)
2] dδit+1/dyit = 
  1/[2(2-δit+1)] + [1/2(2-δit+1)
2 (S.o.c)]              (14) 
 
In (14), the first term is positive – and decreases in income - to reflect the income effect that 
generates higher bequests, and the second term is negative because of the adverse income effect 
on work norms.  
  To further illustrate the transitional dynamics, consider two dynasties, with different 
(but similar) incomes and initially identical work attitudes, yr0 > yp0, δr0 = δp0.   The above 
analysis implies that, in period 1, there will be divergence in work attitudes, the poor dynasty 
developing  a  stricter  attitude  than  the  rich  dynasty,  δr1  <  δp1;  correspondingly,  income 
convergence will take place.  To generate an example of the reversal of fortune, suppose that   18 
period 2's productivity is very large relatively to family incomes, a2 >> yr1 > yp0.  It then 
follows  from  (13)  that  period  1's  differences  in  family  incomes  play  a  negligible  role  in 
determining  period  2's  incomes;  in  contrast,  the  differences  in  work  attitudes  is  all  that 
matters.
15  These considerations lead to 
   
Proposition 3.  There is a possibility of an endogenous reversal in income ranking across some 
households from one period to the next. 
   
This  analysis  helps  identify  the  circumstances  under  which  reversals  of  fortunes  are  more 
likely.  When the next-period productivity is high, the differences in family incomes become 
less important relatively to the differences in work efforts by the young – which, in turn, hinge 
upon  instilled  work attitudes.   This is when  the  stricter  work  attitude  of  the  poor  families 
translates into better fortunes for their descendants relative to the rich dynasties. 
    
 
5. Extensions 




                                                            
15 That this is not a knife edge scenario can be seen from the observation that if, initially, the rich family's work norm is 
stronger, δr0 > δp0, the above analysis implies convergence in both work norms and, therefore, incomes.      19 
Labor productivity and labor supply 
Labor productivity bears implications on differences in labor supply across individuals and 
their changes over time.  Totally differentiating (7) with respect to income, we obtain: 
 
  dnit+1 / dyit = -(1-δit+1) /(2-δit+1) (1/ at+1) + (2+yit/ at+1) / (2-δit+1)
2 (dδit+1 / dyit) < 0 
so  that  labor  supply  is  a  decreasing  function  of  family  income.    Note,  however,  that 
d
2nit+1/dyitdat+1 > 0, implying that the higher labor productivity the less steep is the decrease.  
This is consistent with Costa, 2000, who finds using the US data that the elasticity of labor 
supply  with  respect  to  income  was  steeply  negative  in  the  1890s,  but  became  much  more 
moderate toward 1973. 
  Further, suppose now by way of extension that labor productivity, ait+1, consists of 
individual specific (εit+1) as well as of cohort specific (at+1) components, ait+1 = at+1 εit+1, where 
in each period εit+1 is independently and identically distributed.  The above analysis then goes 
through with ait+1 replacing at+1 everywhere.  The equilibrium depends on labor productivity as 
well as on family income.  It can then be shown through a direct extension of the above that 
dδit+1/dεit+1 > 0, so that a higher individual labor productivity implies a stricter work norm.  
When  the  cohort  specific  component  at+1  is  small,  implying  a  small  relative  weight  of 
individual  specific  labor  productivity,  the  differences  in  labor  supply  are  mainly  due  to 
differences in  parental income;  but  when  it  is  large,  the  role  of  parental  incomes  is  small 
relative to the role of labor productivity.  In this case, variations in labor supply are primarily 
due to the variations in work attitudes, whereas the latter increase in labor productivity.  This   20 
observation can be used to explain another finding in Costa, 2000, that the elasticity of labor 
supply with respect to income changed sign in the last decades of that past century: whereas 
until about 1973 it was negative, richer individuals working less, after that the relationship 
reversed itself.  Specifically, this is consistent with an increase in the cohort specific component 
of labor productivity that reduced the relative importance of variation in family incomes and 
enhanced the importance of individual labor productivity differences. 
 
Income redistribution and work norms 
Consider  next  the  effect  of  income  redistribution  policies.    Redistribution  is  modeled  by 
assuming that a proportional income tax, say 0<T<1, is levied on period t's income to finance a 
lump sum next period transfer to every household.  With such budget balanced redistribution 
scheme, the budget constraint each parent faces becomes: 
  yit (1-T) = cit + bit+1                   (1’) 
 
whereas future household’s income is given by: 
  yit+1 = TYt + at+1 nit+1 + bit+1                 (15) 
 
where Yt is the  average period t income.  The higher the tax rate the more intensive income 
redistribution.
16  The sequence of events is as previously described.  
Simple calculations reveal that the analysis of the last two stages of the period decision 
making is as above, with zit = yit (1-T) + TYt replacing yit everywhere.
17  We focus, therefore, on   21 
the third stage.  The first order conditions determining the work attitudes are then as above, 
with 2- nit+1 = (1-δit+1)(2+zit/ at+1) / (2 -δit+1), 
C’(δit+1 -δit) + 1/(2-δit+1) – log [1-δit+1)(2+zit/ at+1) / (2 -δit+1)] = 0       (16) 
 
Totally  differentiating  (16)  and  recalling  the  second  order  conditions,  we  obtain  that  the 
equilibrium work attitude increases in T when yit > Yt and decreases in T otherwise.  Comparing 
high-redistribution with low-redistribution societies, this then implies that that work ethic is 
expected to be stricter among the rich and weaker among the poor in the former relative to the 
latter. 
Totally differentiating with respect to yit as in the above analysis yields 
dδit+1/dyit = (S.o.c) (zit+2 at+1)/(1-T) < 0              
     
and further differentiation reveals that d
2δit+1/dyit dT < 0, implying that the inverse relationship 
between family income and work norms is steeper in redistributive societies.    
 
Richer channels of cultural transmission 
The  relatively  simple  mechanism  of  cultural  transmission  studied  in  this  paper  could  be 
extended by considering more general forms of social influences, oblique socialization in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
16 A constant tax rate across time is assumed for simplicity. 
17 Thus, the amount of bequests as determined from the first order conditions in the last stage is bit+1 = (yit(1-T) 
+TYt - at+1 nit+1)/2, so that yit+1 = (yit(1-T) +TYt + at+1 nit+1)/2; and nit+1 = [2 – (1-δit+1)(yit(1-T) + TYt)]/ (2-δit+1) and 
2- nit+1  = (1-δit+1)(2+(yit(1-T) +TYt)/ at+1) / (2 -δit+1)  .   
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broad context.  Suppose, for instance, that a child's work norm, δit+1
C, is shaped as, say, a 
weighted average of   both own parental influence,  δit+1, and of the average of all parents' 
influences, δit+1
C = αδit+1 + (1- α) ∫ +
1
0
1dj jt δ  , 0 < α < 1 (the case studied above corresponds to α 
= 1).  It can be shown then the larger values of α imply a lower elasticity of labor with respect 
to parental imposition of a work norm.  This, in turn, implies a reduced willingness on the part 
of the parents to instill in their children a work norm that is different from their own as each 
parent attempts to "free ride" on other parents.  As pointed out by a referee, this would weaken 
the commitment value of instilling strong work norms, thereby reducing the plausibility of 
income reversals.  One possibility to reduce the free riding incentives in this context, briefly 
considered in a previous version of the paper, is by collective decision making on work norms, 
through,  for  example,  the  mechanism  of  public  schooling.    A  detailed  analysis  of  its 
ramifications is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
   
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This  paper  endogenizes  the  determination  of  work  attitudes  in  a  dynamic  macroeconomic 
context.    Its  building  block  is  intergenerational  conflict  of  interests  between  parents  and 
children that results in disincentives to generate adequate work effort in anticipation of parental 
transfer.  Parental instilling of work norms is then an instrument to mitigate their moral hazard 
consequences, and the motive to use it decreases with income.  Survey data indicate support for   23 
this inverse relationship. This, further, generates the possibility of dynastic reversals of fortune, 
whereby descendants of poor families overtake rich families' descendants.    
The findings on convergence, in education and in earnings, between second generation 
immigrants and the natives, and even the overtaking of the latter by the former are consistent 
with the model's framework.  Moreover, these pieces of evidence about reversals of fortunes 
pertaining to population groups also help to distinguish our model from the standard models of 
intertemporal mobility that rely on exogenous ability variations.  Since ability is perceived in 
these  models  to  be  an  individual  specific  characteristic,  they  do  not  seem  to  be  generally 
consistent  with  the  rise  and  fall  of  groups  of  individuals.    In  contrast,  this  paper's  model 
generates  predictions  that  may  explain  the  emergence  of  group-specific  norms  relevant  for 
these groups' economic success or failure. 
Future research could proceed in at least two directions.  One would be to try and relax 
some of the model's assumptions (exogenously given one offspring in each generation; limited 
altruism in regard to future generations that only pertains to one's immediate offspring; parental 
inability  to  indirectly  commit  bequests  through  indirect  transfers,  such  as  investing  in 
education).  Another, empirical avenue, would be a longitudinal analysis of labor decisions of 
second generation immigrants as compared to natives that could possibly lend further support 
to the paper's argument.      24 
 
Appendix 
Definitions of variables for Table 1 
 
 
"Work is what makes life worth living, 
not leisure" 
The question: Which point on this scale most clearly describes how much 
weight you place on work (including housework and schoolwork), as 
compared with leisure or recreation?  
(1) It's leisure that makes life worth living, not work, (2).., (3),…,  
(4), (5) Work is what makes life worth living, not leisure. 
"Work should always come first, even 
if it mean less spare time" 
The question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time:  
(1) Strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither agree or disagree, (4) 
agree, and (5) strongly agree. 
(Re-categorized in the opposite direction for consistency) 
Income scale  1st lowest decile – 10th highest decile 
Women  Dummy: 1 Woman, 0 Man 
Education 
Years of education (incomplete primary: 3 / complete primary: 6 / 
incomplete secondary: 8.5 / complete secondary: 11 / incomplete 
secondary university prep.: 12.5 / complete secondary university prep: 14 
/ inocmplete university: 13.5 / complete university 
Marital status  Dummies: Married / Separate, divorced or widow / Single (Omitted) 
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spare time" 















































Observations  47327  46914  64982  64677 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.07 
 
 
Robust  standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.    All  regressions  include  country  dummies  and  standard  errors 
adjusted for country level clustering   
* Significant at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent.  